CDS Volatility: the Key Signal of Credit Quality by R. Castellano & R.L. D'Ecclesia
Annals of Operations Research
 
CDS Volatility: the Key Signal of Credit Quality
--Manuscript Draft--
 
Manuscript Number: ANOR-2216R1
Full Title: CDS Volatility: the Key Signal of Credit Quality
Article Type: SI: OR in Banking Management
Keywords: Credit Default Swaps;  Event Study;  Exponential GARCH.
Corresponding Author: Rita Laura D'Ecclesia, PhD
Sapienza University
Roma, ITALY
Corresponding Author Secondary
Information:
Corresponding Author's Institution: Sapienza University
Corresponding Author's Secondary
Institution:
First Author: Rita Laura D'Ecclesia, PhD
First Author Secondary Information:
Order of Authors: Rita Laura D'Ecclesia, PhD
Rosella Castellano, PhD
Order of Authors Secondary Information:
Abstract: This paper investigates the role of CDS volatility in providing information concerning
the credit quality of a company.
In Castellano and D'Ecclesia (2011) a first analysis of how CDS quotes respond to
rating announcements is provided and it showed that market participants do not rely
much on Rating Agencies, especially during periods characterized by very high
volatility, i.e. during a financial crisis. Here, a more accurate analysis of the CDS's
ability  to provide timely information on the creditworthiness of reference entities is
performed, estimating the volatility of CDS quotes by using Exponential GARCH(1,1)
models. The event study methodology is applied to a sample of CDS quotes for US
and European markets, over the period 2004-2009. Results provide an accurate
understanding of market behavior in the presence of news released by Rating
Agencies. Overall, market participants seem to provide timely reactions around the
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Reply to Referee’s Report n. 1 on ANOR-2216 
“Credit Quality and CDS volatility: the key signal” 
 
We are very grateful to the anonymous Referee who provided us with valuable suggestions to 
improve the current version of the paper. We were able to take into account all the comments 
reported  and tried to prepare a new version of the paper.  
Please find below our reply to specific comments: 
1) Regarding the information provided by the abnormal returns we think an additional 
contribution is  given.  In the analysis we presented a distinction between the effect of 
rating announcements on CDS quotes for different rating class companies. In particular, 
using the E-GARCH model to  estimate volatility yielded  to prove that for A rated 
companies an anticipation of the downgrading occurs on average sixty days before the 
event, while for B rated companies a shortest anticipation occurs.  
2) Regarding the presence of contamination, we have better described the type of data we 
used and make sure we were able to work with a data set in which overlapping of events 
had been removed. During the period of the analysis we would have had a much larger 
dataset if we had used all the rating events occurred in the  markets. A long, clean-of-
events estimation period was used to study each company’s behavior. 
3) The use of the Norden-Weber  (2004) approach to use CDS index benchmarks to account 
for the systematic risk was taken into account in our previous study, Castellano and 
D’Ecclesia, 2011. We considered the excess return of each CDS quote with respect to the 
corresponding CDS indexes, ITRAXX or  CDX, depending on whether the company was 
located in the US or Europe,  The results obtained were non-conclusive and in our 
Response to Reviewer Comments
opinion this was due to the nature of the CDS indices which do not take into account the 
different rating classes of the companies, which in our opinion provide a crucial 
contribution to the understanding of market creditworthiness. 
4)  Regarding the quality of the estimates for the E-GARCH model we were able to run a 
sensitivity analysis in order to validate the stability of the results obtained. Moving from 
210 data to 350 data (as it is shown in section 4 , Figures 3-8) the E-GARCH parameters 
do not result statistically different, providing support to the use of E-GARCH model 
using the original Estimation period + Test period. 
5) The use of the  method suggested by Andersen, T., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F.X. and 
Vega, C. (2003), in "Micro Effects of Macro Announcements: Real-Time Price Discovery 
in Foreign Exchange," American Economic Review, 93, 38-62, will be considered in the 
subsequent paper where we would like to investigate the presence of structural breaks in 
the variance dynamics making different assumptions for different classes of rating.  The 
purpose of the current paper is to overcome the limits of the standard Events Study 
Methodology which is based on the use of constant volatility which cannot be applied to 
the CDS cases.   
6) The calculation of returns using the difference between CDS quotes has the specific role 
of providing information on the creditworthiness of the company given the nature of the 
quote. The difference between the CDS quote and the benchmark provides immediate 
information on the spread investors require to protect from the worst credit quality. Using 
the percentage returns would have yielded different information. 
Reply to Referee’s Report n. 3 on ANOR-2216 
“Credit Quality and CDS volatility: the key signal” 
 
We are very grateful to the anonymous referee who provided us with valuable suggestions to 
improve the current version of the paper. We were able to take into account all the comments 
reported  and tried to prepare a new version of the paper.  
Please find below our reply to specific comments: 
1) The amount of data was constrained by the need to remove any contamination provided 
by the presence of overlapping events. We were able to work with a data set in which 
overlapping events had been removed. So a long, clean-of-events estimation period was 
used to study each company’s behavior. We were able to run a sensitivity analysis in 
order to validate the stability of the results obtained. Moving from 210 data to 350 data 
(as is shown in section 4 , Figures 3-8) the E-GARCH parameters do not prove 
statistically different, providing support to the use of E-GARCH models using the 
original Estimation + Test period. 
2) We have extended the length of the Estimation period up to 150 days only where 
possible, given the constraints mentioned in 1. No significant difference was observed in 
the results. Therefore we conclude that a 100 day length for the Estimation Period is able 
to provide an accurate estimation of what can be defined as “normal” behavior of the 
CDS quotes. 
3) The purpose of the current paper is to overcome the limits of the standard Events Study 
Methodology which is based on the use of constant volatility which cannot be applied to 
the CDS case.   The use of the  method suggested by Andersen, T., Bollerslev, T., 
Response to Reviewer Comments
Diebold, F.X. and Vega, C. (2003), in "Micro Effects of Macro Announcements: Real-
Time Price Discovery in Foreign Exchange," American Economic Review, 93, 38-62, will 
be considered in the subsequent paper, where we would like to investigate the presence of 
structural breaks in the variance dynamics making different assumptions for different 
classes of rating.   
4) We have provided additional evidence of differences between A-rated and B-rated 
companies in the current version of the paper also adding more evidence of the different 
behavior of the conditional volatility for the various rating classes. In our opinion the 
main contribution of the analysis is to highlight how the rating class affects investor’s 
behavior.  
5) Unfortunately it was not possible to test separately for reviews that lead to a rating 
change versus all reviews. given the size of the sample. 
6) In the sample we used we avoided any presence of contamination, as highlighted in 1). In 
this respect, the reaction around downgrades cannot be attributed, in this analysis, to the 
fact that most of the reviews are followed by a downgrade and the average distance 
between the two events is 44 days.  
 
CDS Volatility: the Key Signal of Credit Quality
Rosella Castellano∗, Rita L. D’Ecclesia†
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of CDS volatility in providing infor-
mation concerning the credit quality of a company.
In Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2011) a first analysis of how CDS quotes
respond to rating announcements is provided and it showed that market
participants do not rely much on Rating Agencies, especially during pe-
riods characterized by very high volatility, i.e. during a financial crisis.
Here, a more accurate analysis of the CDS’s ability to provide timely
information on the creditworthiness of reference entities is performed, es-
timating the volatility of CDS quotes by using Exponential GARCH(1,1)
models. The event study methodology is applied to a sample of CDS
quotes for US and European markets, over the period 2004-2009. Results
provide an accurate understanding of market behavior in the presence
of news released by Rating Agencies. Overall, market participants seem
to provide timely reactions around the event date and we show that the
key element of signaling is represented by the changing volatility in CDS
quotes, before and after the rating event.
JEL Classification Numbers: G14, G01, G12, C58.
Keywords: Credit Default Swaps; Event Study; Exponential GARCH.
1 Introduction
The effect of rating announcements on financial market dynamics has been
widely discussed in the literature. Earlier studies concentrated on the anal-
ysis of stock and bond price dynamics and investigated how rating changes
∗University of Macerata, Italy. Email: castellano@unimc.it
†University of Rome ”La Sapienza”, Italy. Email: rita.decclesia@uniroma1.it
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could affect market behavior (Bremer and Pettway, 2002; Steiner and Heinke,
2001; Gropp and Richards, 2001; Kliger and Saring, 2000; only to cite a few).
The introduction of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) provides useful information
regarding the creditworthiness of a company. Consequently the analysis of how
rating changes may affect CDS quote dynamics may reveal additional informa-
tion regarding the investor’s perception of the changing creditworthiness of a
company. When pronouncing on an issuer’s creditworthiness, rating agencies
face a trade-off between timeliness and possibly creating adverse volatility. In-
formation to assess an issuer’s creditworthiness arrives at a high frequency, and
so credit ratings must be continually updated since they have to incorporate the
latest information. Rating agencies attempt to balance these conflicting goals
by making multiple announcements, some of which reflect the latest information
and others, following the through-the-cycle methodology, provide a stable signal
of credit quality.
In Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2011) the effects caused by rating announce-
ments (rating changes and reviews) on CDS quotes have been analyzed using
standard Event Study methodology. The results of the analysis were not al-
ways in line with expectations and, in some cases, inconclusive. In some studies
(Norden and Weber, 2004; Hull et al., 2004; to cite the most relevant) evidences
of abnormal changes in CDS quotes have been found, showing that markets
anticipate rating announcements in case of ”bad news”. In addition, in most
cases no post announcements effects were found. Some other studies (Micu et
al. 2006) find that reviews, rating changes and outlooks affect market behavior
and the market does not anticipate any rating agency actions.
In our opinion, the aforementioned studies have a major constraint as they
assume constant volatility of market quotes, while heteroscedasticity often char-
acterizes the real market. Hence, the assumption of constant volatility causes
biases in the results. When bad news on creditworthiness reach the market,
CDS quotes increase and, in line with the volatility clustering issue, also the
volatility of CDS quotes increases. Castellano and Scaccia (2010, 2011) relax
the assumption of omoscedasticity by exploiting the ability of Hidden Markov
Models to model state-dependent means and variances of CDS returns. They
find that CDS return series build around negative rating events are characterized
2
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by very different temporal dynamics. This heterogeneity may cause a general
underestimation of the market anticipations and reactions, when abnormal re-
turns are cumulated over time and averaged over series as in classical Event
Study analysis.
In this paper, we extend Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2011) results, by tak-
ing into account the role played by stochastic volatility. Following Yamaguchi
(2008), and Corhay and Rad (1996), we estimate the volatility of CDS quotes
using the E-GARCH models (Nelson, 1991) and we then use the Event Study
methodology to investigate market reactions. This approach offers a more re-
liable instrument to interpret the signals supplied by CDS markets trough the
exploitation of the information linked with stochastic volatilities and CDS re-
turn levels, which allow to identify abnormal market conditions.
The analysis is performed using a larger set of data than previous stud-
ies and the effects of rating announcements, reviews and effective changes, on
CDS quotes are investigated. The data covers the period 2004 - 2009 for 60
international companies belonging to different credit grades.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, some relevant literature in
rating announcements is reviewed; Section 3 describes the methodology, showing
the importance of introducing E-GARCH estimations to measure the conditional
variance of abnormal spread changes; Section 4 describes the data set, while
Section 5 provides a brief description of the results; finally, Section 6 reports
our conclusions.
2 Some recent literature
The main goal of credit rating is to facilitate the comparison of an issuer’s
underlying long-term creditworthiness by means of standardized categories, so
rating decisions are typically not influenced by events whose impact on credit
quality is expected to be temporary (Micu et al., 2006; Weinstein, 1977). For
this reason, rating agencies provide various kinds of announcements. Outlooks
and reviews were introduced in the 80’s to meet investor demand for more timely
indicators and forewarn investors of possible changes in creditworthiness. More
precisely, outlooks reflect the likely direction of an issuer’s credit quality over
3
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the medium term (usually two years). It is modified when a change in the
issuer’s risk profile is observed, but it is not regarded as permanent enough to
review the credit rating. Reviews, on the other hand, provide stronger signals
than outlooks about future changes in rating, highlighting a high probability
of upgrading or downgrading. Reviews are usually concluded within 90 days,
after the receipt of additional information, clarifying the impact of a particular
event on credit quality. Credit ratings need not be on review to be changed so
reviews or changes in outlook do not always imply changes in rating.
The variety of research papers related to our study is diverse. The effects
of rating announcements on market quotes have been investigated mainly using
stock (Best, 1997; Akhigbe et al., 1997) and bond prices (Bremer and Pettway,
2002; Gropp and Richards, 2001; Kliger and Sarig, 2000). Since bond markets
are related to credit markets, results obtained for bond markets can be directly
compared to those obtained for CDS markets.
Covitz and Harrison (2003) estimate that almost 75 per cent of the changes in
bond prices occur six months before the rating downgrade. Only few studies find
that rating announcements have different effects on equity markets compared
to credit markets. Goh and Ederington (1993) find that the potential impact
of rating announcements on equity prices is ambiguous and depends on the
motivation of the announcement. When rating announcements are motivated by
changes in the issuer’s financial perspectives, they should have the same impact
on equity and bond markets; negative (positive) rating announcements should
cause a fall (rise) in equity prices. By contrast, rating announcements caused
by changes in leverage should have opposite effects in equity and bond markets;
negative (positive) announcements motivated by an increase in leverage should
result in a rise (fall) in equity prices. Kliger and Sarig (2000) find that rating
announcements cause bond and equity prices to move in opposite directions.
As we focus on the effects that ratings announcements have on CDS quotes,
we mainly refer to studies which have been applied to similar data sets, including
Hull et al. (2004), Norden et al. (2004), Ammer and Clinton (2004), Micu et
al. (2006), and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010). Hull et al., (2004) and Norden
et al., (2004), conclude that the reaction of CDS prices is most pronounced in
the case of reviews for downgrade. Ammer and Clinton (2004) conclude for
4
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a significant negative reaction of asset-backed securities’ prices to downgrades.
Generally, with a few notable exceptions (Katz et al., 1974; Kliger and Sarig,
2000; Micu et al., 2006), findings show that upgrades or reviews for upgrade do
not have a significant impact on prices. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find that
CDS markets anticipate negative events while positive events have a positive
impact on CDS markets only in the two day period surrounding the event.
Even though results show that negative announcements impact prices, most of
the price adjustments takes place before the announcements.
3 The Event Study methodology
Empirical tests of market efficiency examine price adjustments before, during
and after a rating announcement. In short, if credit ratings convey new infor-
mation, prices should react after a rating event causing CDS quotes to increase
in the presence of a deterioration in the creditworthiness of a company. Since
increases in CDS quotes cause changes in the volatility level in line with the
argument of volatility clustering, this has to be taken into account when esti-
mating abnormal CDS spread changes with respect to a chosen benchmark.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of rating announcements
on CDS markets in the presence of stochastic volatility. We expect significant
positive changes in CDS quotes, together with an increase in volatility’s level,
at or after the negative rating events (the opposite holds for positive rating
events). In some cases, credit markets may anticipate rating announcements
and so abnormal performances may be detected before the event.
The following hypothesis are made:
• Markets react after review announcements because they reveal new in-
formation. Reviews in most cases anticipate the actual rating changes,
therefore markets should react. No effective reactions are therefore ex-
pected around actual rating changes following the reviews.
• Markets react only after rating change announcements and do not show
any abnormal reaction before it.
The results presented in Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2011) show that, in some
5
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cases, changes in CDS quotes may not have reflected announcements made by
rating agencies. This has been particularly true in periods of very volatile quotes
such as during the recent financial crisis. Standard Event Study methodology
assumes constant volatility of abnormal returns and this may cause bias in the
results. In financial time series it has been proven that volatility clustering
occurs, so that in period of large changes, volatility reaches high levels. In order
to take into account the role played by the volatility of CDS quotes, in this
paper we suggest to use an E-GARCH model.
The main idea is to compare, for each reference entity i, the CDS daily
changes, defined as Si,t:
Si,t = CDSi,t − CDSi,t−1 (1)
with some chosen benchmark, assuming that residuals can be measured by E-
GARCH models.
The chosen benchmark for each reference entity i, for the purpose of our
analysis, is the mean change, E(Si,0), computed over a period of ”normal be-
havior” identified as the estimation period.
Following Armitage (1995), to capture the effects of any rating announce-
ment on CDS quotes we define:
• the event date, t∗ = 0, for a sample of CDS subject to rating announce-
ments;
• the estimation period, EP, where the ”normal behavior” or ”bench-
mark” of CDS changes is measured;
• a test period, TP, or event window where the abnormal reactions of
CDS quotes to announcements are analyzed.
The EP in this analysis has to be chosen in order to have a time span which
could provide an efficient measure of normal behavior, given the large number
of rating events occurred. For the sample of data used in this paper an interval
of 100 days results to be the average maximum length to identify what can
be considered normal behavior. The TP is set equal to 110 days divided in 6
subintervals:
Ij = [tj , tj+1]; for j = 1, .., 6
Each Ij measures the number of business days before, after and around the
6
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rating announcement;
An example of EP and TP is reported in the following scheme:
INSERT SCHEME ABOUT HERE
The effective abnormal spread changes are calculated within the TP (for
further details see Norden andWeber, 2004) which starts 90 business days before
the event’s occurrence, t∗ = 0, and ends 20 business days after the event.
We test the following hypothesis:
• If rating announcements are fully anticipated, then CDS quotes should
adjust prior to the announcement in one of the four subintervals, I1,..., I4.
• If no anticipation occurs, announcements should have an effect on quotes
only around the day of the event, i.e. subinterval I5.
• In cases of illiquidity, the impact of rating announcements might be de-
layed to I6, i.e. after the event occurrence.
3.1 Abnormal spread changes
In order to investigate the effects of an event it is necessary to evaluate the ab-
normal spread, ASit, which measures the difference between the realized returns
in the TP and the chosen benchmark:
ASit = (Si,t − E(Si,0)) . (2)
After totalling the abnormal spreads of firm i, for each t, the cumulative abnor-
mal spreads, CASi, are calculated over the various subperiods, Ij , ∀ j = 1, .., 6 :
CASi [Ij ] =
∑
t∈Ij
ASit. (3)
The cross-sectional average CAS can be computed for each subperiods, Ij , and
all the firms, i:
ACAS [Ij ] =
Ns∑
i=1
CASi [Ij ]
Ns
(4)
where Ns is the number of firms subject to disclosure.
7
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3.2 Volatility dynamics
We assume that abnormal spreads, ASit, are conditionally heteroscedastic:
ASit = εit|Ψi,t−1 ∼ N(0, hit) (5)
According to Batchelor and Orakcioglu (2010), three sources of heteroscedas-
ticity may be observed. The first two are well recognized in the Event Study
literature, while the third is very familiar in empirical finance, but relatively
neglected in Event Study applications.
First, the model pools data from a number of different companies and time
periods. The classical Event Study methodology means one necessarily con-
strains the effects of rating announcements on CDS abnormal spreads to be
equal across companies. However, the variance of ASit may not be constant
across companies subject to disclosure. As it is shown in Figures 1 and 2, we
observe sizable differences in the behavior of variances of abnormal CDS spreads
for the companies in the sample. This type of heteroscedasticity can be easily
handled by normalizing the data – that is, by dividing all the observations on
each company or event by the standard deviation of observations across that
company.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
(Figure 1. AS over the EP+TP period around a specific event).
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
(Figure 2. AS over the EP+TP period around a specific event).
Second, there is no reason why the variance of abnormal spreads should
be constant throughout the TP. Indeed, previous results by Castellano and
D’Ecclesia (2010) did not provide any support to the hypothesis of specific
effects of rating announcements, mainly because a constant variance assumption
was made. In our opinion, an adequate Event Study analysis has to consider
a time varying variance over the pre- and post-event periods. In principle,
this may be handled through data normalization – for instance, by dividing
each observation not by the whole-event sample standard deviation, but by
8
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the standard deviation within the relevant inside-event window to which the
observation belongs, as suggested by Boehmer et al. (1991). Heteroscedasticity
of this kind is termed ”event induced conditional heteroscedasticity”.
Third, the GARCH model of Bollerslev (1986) has been found to provide
a good description of the variance in daily stock returns (see, for instance:
Akgiray, 1989; de Santis and Imrohoroglu, 1997). In GARCH models, any
large shock to a share price which causes an exceptionally high or low abnormal
return on a particular day, also causes the variance of returns to be high on the
following day, and to decay slowly back to its long run average ‘unconditional’
value. So, if a dividend event causes a large mispricing on the post-dividend
day, say, prices are likely to be volatile for many days thereafter. Although
there is much discussion of event-induced variance in the Event Study literature
(Batchelor and Orakcioglu, 2010), few studies take the step of modelling the
variance of returns through a GARCH process, given the large computational
problems which may arise.
Assuming that the ASit, are conditionally heteroscedastic
εit =
√
hit · zt zt ∼ N(0, 1) (6)
we find that the E-GARCH(1,1) specification proposed by Nelson (1991) ade-
quately fits the volatility process, hit, of the sampled series:
ln(hit) = αi + β1i
∣∣∣∣∣
εit−1√
hit−1
∣∣∣∣∣+ β2i
εit−1√
hit−1
+ ηi ln(hit−1). (7)
The main feature of the E-GARCH models is that in [7] the log of the variances,
ln(hit), will be positive regardless of whether the coefficients on the right side
are positive. The conditional variance (7) is constrained to be non-negative by
the assumption that the logarithm of hit is a function of past innovations, εit.
The second and third term in the RHS take into account the magnitude and the
sign of εit. This enables hit to respond asymmetrically to positive and negative
values of εit. This feature is very important to model the behavior of CDS’s
spread changes (i.e. positive changes of CDS show a worsening in the credit
quality of a company and vice versa).
After estimating the parameters in [7] , we can obtain the conditional vari-
ance, hit, for each firm, i, and time t. To apply Event Study methodology, the
average variances over each subinterval, Ij , are estimated:
9
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hi(Ij) =
∑
t∈Ij
exp(hit)
NIj
j = 1, ..., 6 (8)
where NIj is the number of days in each corresponding time interval. The cross
sectional variance of the average CAS is given by:
V AR [ACAS (Ij)] =
1
Ns
Ns∑
i=1
hi(Ij).
A cross-sectional J-test aimed at verifying the null hypothesis, H0, that the
event does not affect the spread changes (H0 : ASit = 0; H1 : ASit ≶ 0) is
defined by:
J =
ACAS [Ij ]√
1
Ns−1
V AR [ACAS(Ij)]
J ∼ N(0, 1).
4 The data set
The data set is entirely obtained from Bloomberg and consists of:
• 5 years maturity single name (CMA) CDS daily quotes1 over the period
2004-2009;
• credit rating data and events, considering effective rating changes and re-
views, provided by the three major international rating agencies, Standard
& Poors, Fitch and Moody’s.
The total sample is composed of 89.103 CDS quotes linked to 60 firms, 32
from Europe and 28 from the USA. All the 60 market-wide CDS contracts
refer to senior unsecured reference obligation. Companies are further divided
into different rating classes to investigate the possibility of different reactions to
rating announcements.
Negative rating events clearly dominate the period given the occurrence of
financial crisis. The total number of events we were able to select for our analysis
is 420. The events were selected taking into account the size of the Estimation
Period in order to avoid the presence of overlapping events. It is worth noticing
here that, even though most of the announcements for the same company are
1The CMA database quotes lead the price discovery process in comparison with quotes
provided by other databases (Mayordomo et al., 2010)
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released by each credit rating agency in different days, in some cases announce-
ments were released simultaneously. In order to avoid contamination effects
due to simultaneous or multiple rating events in the TP and EP, we start with
the first rating event for each firm and analyze subsequently TP and EP which
include only one observation of a particular event type. A description of the
sample is reported in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
We selected 420 events of which 155 reviews and 265 rating changes. Out of
155 reviews, 120 were followed by an effective rate change (either downgrading
or upgrading). The average number of days between a review and an effective
rate change was 44 days. More than the 80% of the events refer to a worsening
in credit quality, i.e. reviews for downgrading or downgradings. Precisely:
• 132 negative reviews out of 155 (85%);
• 228 downgradings out of a total of 265 (86%) actual rating changes (pos-
itive or negative).
The largest occurrence of negative events was during 2007-2009. As would
be expected. S&P and Moody’s were almost equal in the number of events for
each class and both provide a larger set of announcements than Fitch.
4.1 Dynamics of CDS changes
In Table 2 some statistics regarding the CDS average daily spreads by class of
rating are reported.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
It is interesting to note that, on average, daily CDS spreads increase with the
reduction of credit quality. However, we should point out that when looking at
speculative grade companies, the expected relationship between CDS quotes and
credit quality is violated, highlighting the presence of cases of spread reversal.
For instance, the average spread for B rated companies is lower than the average
spread for Ba rated companies.
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The abnormal spread changes over the sample period show no stationarity.
A preliminary study of the stationarity of the ASit, was performed
2. All the
series of Abnormal Spreads for each of the examined companies, were found to
be I(1), as can be seen clearly in Figure 1 and 2. To estimate for each company
the variance of the abnormal spread changes we use the E-GARCH(1,1) model.
Precisely, the E-GARCH(1,1) variance is estimated by maximum likelihood us-
ing the 210 day interval (EP+TP).
For each company, the model performs well and almost all of the E-GARCH(1,1)
parameters were statistically significant. Table 3 reports the percentages of sta-
tistically significant parameters and the percentages of positive parameters for
the 210 day interval, divided by rating class and region. The tested null Hy-
pothesis is H0 : θ = [α, β1, β2, η] = 0.
The E-GARCH(1,1) model performs well for both downgrades or reviews.
For each estimated vector θ, the parameters, β1, β2, η and α were found to be
statistically significant more than 80% of the time. Some differences were found
between A rated and B rated companies. In the former case, the percentage
of significance is higher for the GARCH parameter, β1, (100%); while in the
latter it is higher for the leverage parameter, β2, (90,2%). So the variance of
CDS quotes for A rated companies depends more on the size of the abnormal
spread changes, while in the case of B rated companies the sign of the spread
changes has higher impact. We may state that in the case of A rated companies
a rating event causes large changes in CDS quotes which affect the variance
behavior and, in the case of B rated companies, the sign of the changes may
have a relevant influence.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In order to test the robustness of the estimation we performed a sensitivity
analysis by considering larger time intervals of up to 350 days. In this way
we are able to study how the E-GARCH parameters change with increasing
interval length. For each company and each event, the vector of parameters
θ was estimated using different time intervals ts, s = 1, .., 5. Where s = 1
refers to the initial time length, t1 = 210. The interval length is increased
2The results of the ADF test performed on each company ASit series around every event
are not reported in the article but available upon request.
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of 35 days each time s is increased, in order to have t2 = 245, t3 = 280,
t4 = 315, t5 = 350. For each element of θ, a t-test was used to investigate
possible significant differences due to the different time length. The t−statistics
estimated to test the null hypothesis
(
H0 : θts = θts+1
)
yield no statistically
significant results. For each company, using the vectors of parameters θts the
conditional variance in Equation (7) was also estimated.
Some examples of the estimated parameters for a sample of A rated compa-
nies using different time intervals are reported in Figures 3, 4 and 5. Figures 6,
7 and 8 show the same for B rated companies.
INSERT FIGURES 3, 4 and 5 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURES 6, 7 and 8 ABOUT HERE
The E-GARCH(1,1) variance of the ASit, for each event, is defined by (7) .
The variance on day t, hit, is conditional on the variance of the previous day,
hi,t−1, the size, |ǫit−1| and the sign, ǫit−1, of the most recent Abnormal Spread,
ASit = ǫit. In a steady state, assuming the ǫit is set equal to its expected
value, E(ǫit) = 0, and the variance constant over time: hi,t−1 = hit = hi, the
unconditional variance for each company, i, subject to disclosure is:
hi = e
(
αi
1−ηi
)
. (9)
According to the E-GARCH model, a large change in the abnormal spread,
ǫit, causes an increase of volatility of CDS quotes which is measured by the
GARCH coefficient β1 and by the asymmetry coefficient, β2. Any big change
in the abnormal spread will have a persistent effect on the CDS dynamics,
raising abnormal spread changes for a number of days afterwards. The degree
of persistence depends on the size of the coefficient η. When η is relatively
large, volatility takes a long time to fade away following an announcement in
the market.
The estimated time dependent variance differs across companies and events.
The values of θ estimated for each company and each event are reported in
Tables 4 and 5. Specifically, in Table 4, are reported the average values of
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each parameter computed for companies of different rating class in the case of
downgradings for the entire sample, which is divided into two subperiods: pre-
crisis and post-crisis. In Table 5, corresponding statistics refer to the reviews.
The various E- GARCH parameters across the various companies show the
dominant impact of the occurrence of shocks, or large changes in Abnormal
Spreads. The estimates of the GARCH coefficient, β1, and the asymmetry
component, β2, show the largest average values showing that Abnormal Spread’s
volatility is driven by the occurrence of a change in the ASt−1. For instance, in
the case of A rated companies the mean value of the β1 coefficients across com-
panies is 0.906, and the mean value for β2 is 0.532. The degree of persistence,
measured by the coefficient η is on average much lower. In the case of announce-
ments regarding the downgrading η = 0.266, while for reviews the average η is
equal to 0.092.
The class of rating was not found to influence changes in volatility, the main
driver is the occurrence of shocks at time t− 1, which affects the variance for a
number of days afterwards.
INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE
5 Some results
We carried out the J-test on the events in the sample. Tests for subgroups of
events were also performed by rating class and geographical area. It is clear
that European and US markets have different features in terms of liquidity and
investors reaction may depend on the credit grade of the company.
The analysis aims to verify the assumption that market participants some-
how anticipate rating announcements. Table 6 gives the results of the J-test for
the entire sample.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
For all the companies (A+B rated), the J-test was statistically significant
for both reviews for downgrading and effective downgradings in intervals I5
and I6. This clearly demonstrates that CDS quotes show Abnormal changes
right around the event date and in the days following. However, some evidence
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suggests a different reaction by the market to reviews compared to downgrades.
In the case of reviews significant changes were found in the intervals I1 and I2,
but no effects were detected in the intervals I3 and I4. The opposite results
were found for downgradings. We conclude that market participants anticipate
the occurrence of reviews for downgrading sixty to ninety business days before
the event and then react heavily, as shown by the size of the average Abnormal
Spread changes, around and after the event date. We further conclude that
the effective downgrading is reflected in the change of CDS quotes up to forty
business days before the event and some effects take place also after that.
For companies belonging to different classes of rating (Panels A and B in Ta-
ble 6), it is interesting to note different results for reviews for downgrading and
downgradings. For A rated companies which were downgraded the CDS mar-
kets seem to anticipate the occurrence of the event three months in advance,
the only significant statitistics refer to I2. In the case of B rated companies the
CDS markets seem to anticipate the downgrading over a shorter time interval
(I3 = two months), but the effects continue to be relevant given the significant
statistics reported also in the intervals I4, I5 and I6. This shows that downgrad-
ing of Brated companies strongly affects investor reactions, who perceive the
downgrading as the beginning of serious risk and therefore keep requiring an
additional spread. This may also be due to the special period considered in the
analysis given the gravity of the current financial crisis making investors more
sensitive to poor company performances. This was not found to occur with A
rated companies which may be perceived as safe havens at this time.
Tables 7 and 8 report the results of the J-test by geographical area. Different
results are found for the US market where CDS quotes seem to react promptly
to rating announcements. In the case of A rated companies (Panel A table 7) it
is interesting to note that reviews for downgrading are reflected in market quotes
some one to three months ahead of the event, while no post-announcement effect
was found. For B rated companies (Panel B, Table 7) effective downgradings
seem to affect the market’s behavior only in the intervals around the event and
no great anticipation occurs.
Results for the European markets (Table 8) show that participants anticipate
reviews in the intervals I1,I2, I3 and I5, showing significant abnormal spread
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changes. Specifically, market participants price an increase in CDS quotes ninety
days before the occurrence of a review, anticipating official announcements.
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
5.0.1 Conditional Variance
The results of the J-test should be analyzed in conjunction with the behavior of
the conditional volatility, which can provide very useful information. The condi-
tional variance estimated for each Abnormal Spread series accurately describes
the volatility dynamics over the entire period (EP+TP) for each company, suc-
cessfully capturing the change in volatility occurring around the event date.
In Figures 9–12 examples of how the conditional volatility behaves around the
event date for three B rated companies is shown.
INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE
Using the E-GARCH parameters, we calculated the long run unconditional
variance, hi = e
(
αi
1−ηi
)
, and made a useful comparison with the conditional
variance. In Figure 9 and 10 we report the conditional and the unconditional
variance around a specific downgrading event for two A rated companies. For
these two companies the conditional volatility results are always larger than the
unconditional volatility and different patterns occur some three months before
the events. In the case of EON (see Figure 9) the conditional volatility starts
to show completely different dynamics some sixty days before the event, with a
large spike occurring twenty days before the event. In the case of AMEX (Figure
10) the change in volatility dynamics also occurs three months before the event,
in this case the largest increase occurred sixty days before the event. In both
examples no changes in volatility behavior is observed in the days following the
event. This is found for all of the A rated companies. The E-GARCH model
provides the most accurate measure of the Abnormal Spread volatility and this
was also confirmed by the J test for A rated companies, results being statistically
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significant for only the I2 interval, that spans from forty to sixty days before
the event.
INSERT FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE
In Figures 11 and 12 the conditional and unconditional variance for two B
rated companies are reported. It is interesting to note that for B rated companies
the variance dynamics changes forty days before the event and in some cases,
as with MGM for example, the entire dynamics are subsequently altered. In
this case a different approach to study the CDS volatility dynamics should be
used, for instance a study of structural breaks in the volatility should provide
more accurate results. This is beyond the scope of this study, but the authors
are analyzing it for a subsequent paper. Similar results were found for other
companies, confirming the results reported in Table 6 (Panel B), where the
J-test for B rated companies was statistically significant for intervals I3, I4
and I5. The results obtained support our assumption that CDS quotes are
exceptionally volatile once a rating agency’s eye is put on a specific company.
When this occurs, Abnormal Spread volatility changes should be monitored
more than the Abnormal Spread changes, in and of itself.
6 Conclusions
We demonstrate how using conditional variance modeling in the Event Study
methodology yields more accurate results. The volatility represents a key ele-
ment in the assessment of Abnormal Spread changes.
Overall, rating announcements have an effect on CDS quotes mainly around
the event date. In the case of reviews, some anticipatory effects, up to five
months ahead, were found.
In general, European companies appear to be less sensitive to rating agency
news when compared to US companies.
The critical factor is the conditional variance and the E-GARCH model
which succeeds best in tracking the changes in variances around event dates.
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Additionally, the conditional variance of each company provided more effective
signals of the feelings portrayed in the market place than the unconditional long
run variance level.
Our results encourage us to further investigate the role of volatility in provid-
ing information about market behavior. Additional analysis will be conducted
to investigate the existence of structural breaks in the conditional Abnormal
Spread variance.
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